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Summaries 
In 1736 Bayes wrote a tract on Newton's fluxions. 
The tract was one of several explanations of fluxions 
which appeared following Berkeley's attack upon Newton's 
ideas in The Analyst. Bayes began with a careful dis- 
cussion of the meaning of fluxions and prime and ulti- 
mate ratios. He proceeded to develop the properties 
of prime and ultimate ratios in a way not unlike 
Cauchy's treatment of limits, using these results to 
prove some basic theorems concerning the calculation 
of fluxions. 
En 1736, Bayes redigea un essai sur les fluxions 
de Newton. Cet ecrit, en voulant justifier la notion 
de fluxion, participe a la polemique lancee par The 
Analyst de Berkeley. Bayes commence par analyser 
soigneusement la signification des fluxions et des 
rapports premiers et ultimes. Ensuite, il explique 
les proprietes des rapports premiers et ultimes d'une 
manikre qui ressemble 2 l'approche de Cauchy basee sur 
les limites et il utilise les resultats ainsi obtenus 
pour demontrer quelques theoremes fondamentaux du calcul 
des fluxions. 
Izn Jahre 1736 schreib Bayes ein, Abhandlung iiber 
Newtons Fluxionen. Diese Abhandlung war eine von 
mehreren Erklsrungen der Fluxionen, welche The Analyst, 
dem Angriff Berkeleys auf Newtons Ideen, folgten. 
Bayes beginnt tnit einer sorgf2ltigen Diskussion der 
Bedeutung der Fluxionen und der "prime and ultimate 
rations." Daraufhin leitet er die Eigenschaften der 
"prime and ultimate ratios" in einer Weise her, die 
an Cauchy's Behandlug der Grenzwert erinnert, und ver- 
wendet diese Ergebnisse, urn einige grundlegende S;itze 
der Fluxionsrechnung zu beweisen. 
1. THOMAS BAYES 
The lasting fame of Thomas Bayes rests on his "Essay towards 
Solving a Problem in the Doctrine of Chances," published post- 
humously [Bayes 1736bI. Relatively little is known of his life. 
Born in London, in 1702, he appears to have spent his life in 
London and Tunbridge Wells, where he died in 1761. Like his father, 
he was a dissenting minister. He was elected a Fellow of the Royal 
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Society in 1742 [Hacking 1970; Pearson 1978, chap. 121. 
In 1736 the tract which is the subject of this paper appeared: 
An Introduction to the Doctrine of Fluxions and Defence of the 
Mathematicians against the Objections of the Author of the Ana- 
lyst, so far as they are designed to affect their general Methods 
of Reasoning [Bayes 1736al. It was published by J. Noon, but 
bears no indication of authorship; De Morgan, an expert biblio- 
grapher, had no doubt that it was written by Thomas Bayes: "This 
very acute tract is anonymous, but it was always attributed to 
Hayes by the contemporaries who write in the names of the authors 
as I have seen by various copies . ..'I [De Morgan 18601. On such 
bibliographic matters, De Morgan's opini.on is reliable. 
The work was one of many tracts, papers, and books appearing 
after the publication of George Berkeley's The Analyst [Berkeley 
17341 which attacked the soundness of Newton's ideas on fluxions. 
This attack rested mainly on the assertion that Newton had as- 
sumed a quantity to be simultaneously zero and non-zero, and 
that no valid deductions could be based upon such contradictory 
assumptions. 
Bayes' tract on fluxions seems to relatively unknown. One 
of the few references to it was made by Cajori, who described it 
as "a careful effort to present an unobjectionable foundation 
for fluxions" [Cajori 1919, 1571. However, Cajori concentrated 
mainly on the parts of the tract in which Bayes discussed Berke- 
ley's criticism of Newton; Cajori did not indicate how Bayes 
presented "an unobjectionable foundation for fluxions." 
In the Preface Bayes expresses his opinion that the correct- 
ness of the method of fluxions cannot be used in arguments to 
support religion. 
Among all wise and fair inquirers, 'tis beyond 
all contradiction plain, that religion can be no ways 
affected by the truth or falsehood of the doctrine of 
Fluxions. And tho' prejudiced minds may be variously 
affected by it, yet it is not easy to be conceived what 
advantage this debate is likely to give to the cause 
of religion and virtue in general even among them. 
. . . If he should not be able to make out his point, 
will not the blind followers of the Infidel Mathemati- 
cians be more confirmed in their errors than they were 
before? [Bayes 1736a, iii, iv]. 
2. THE DEFINITIONS AND AXIOMS OF BAYES TREATISE (SECTION 1 AND 2) 
In Section 1, of his treatise, Bayes begins his discussion 
of fluxions with the remark that Newton "always seems to have 
studied conciseness of expression . . .'I [Bayes 1736a, 71. Bayes 
infers that the best way of answering Berkeley's criticisms of 
notion of fluxions 
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is to settle the first principles on which the Doc- 
trine of Fluxions depends, and then to show that, by 
just reasoning from them, the rules for finding the 
fluxions of equations, as delivered by Sir Isaac, do 
truly follow [Bayes 1736a, 91. 
The remaining part of Section 1 consists o-5 two postulates and 
comments on them. Postulate I says that "quantities may be sup- 
posed as continually changing." Postulate II: "the notion of 
Fluxions in intelligible." Bayes justifies this by saying: 
For if quantities may increase or decrease . . . 
it will follow that they must change at a certain 
rate . . . [and this is] what Sir Isaac Newton means 
when he defines the Fluxion of a quantity to be the 
velocity or swiftness with which the quantity changes 
its magnitude [Bayes 1736a, g-111. 
Thus Bayes declines to engage in an examination of the pre- 
cise meaning of the ideas of continuous change and instantaneous 
velocity--although Berkeley had specifically raised these issues 
[Berkeley 1734, Sect. 311. Later, in Section III of his Tract, 
Bayes reiterates this position: 
. . . no man make any objections against a velocity 
of increase or decrease in general [i. e., of a flu- 
xion] that will not as strongly lie against a velo- 
city or motion [Berkeley 1734, 341. 
Section 2 begins with seven definitions and five axioms. 
First, a flowing quantity and the fluxion of a flowing quantity 
are defined. In introducing ultimate ratios (Definition 61, 
Bayes supposes a and b to be two flowing quantities; A and B are 
fixed quantities such that a =Afx, b=Bty "always, during the 
time T [this denotes a period of time, not a time coordinate], 
and at the end of that time, a, b, x, y all vanish; then ulti- 
mately a : b :: A:B" [Bayes 1736a, 131. In the remainder of this 
paper, Bayes' :: will be replaced, by =. For Bayes, quantities, 
fluxions, and changes are nonnegative; hence the necessity for 
+ signs here and later. This insistence on using symbols to denote 
non negative quantities leads to some subsequent complications 
in the proofs. 
Definition 7 is a parallel definition of a prime ratio, 
which Bayes writes as pmo a : b = A : B [l]. Bayes remarks that 
"these two definitions are in effect the same with those given 
by Sir Isaac Newton." TWO corollaries follow, in which the 
uniqueness of both the prime and the ultimate ratios of a : b 
are proved. Bayes establishes the first by assuming that ult. 
a: b=A : B and also A : N. Before the end of the time period 
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during which the ultimate ratio is achieved, a : b differs from 
A: B and from A : N by "less than any assignable quantity D"; 
hence "it is plain that A : B = A : N and that therefore B = N. 
Q.E.D. (( [Bayes 1736a, 141. Bayes'mode of argument is the same 
as that used today to prove the uniqueness of limits. 
Now we turn to the five axioms. The first of these asserts 
that "the sum and difference of two flowing and the fourth pro- 
portional to three flowing quantities; and therefore a quantity 
any how made up of given and flowing quantities, must be itself 
a flowing or permanent quantity" [Bayes 1736a, 141. This axiom 
is followed by five corollaries [Bayes 1736a, 14-171: the first 
two are the special cases of the definition in which x or y (or 
both) is zero. In the next two (in Bayes' words) r'you have Sir 
Isaac Newton's description of the ultimate ratio of vanishing 
quantities and the prime ratio of nascent or arising cries." These 
corollaries repeat the substance of Lemma 1 of Section 1, Book 1, 
of the Principia. Bayes comments that although Newton "describes 
it as in Coroll. 4 yet in practice he seems evidently enough to 
make use of one similar to that of Defin. 6" [Bayes 1736a, 161. 
Corollaries 7, 8, and 9 are of considerable interest. They 
assert that if ult. a : b = A : B and ult. b : d = B : D, then 
ult. a+b : b = A t B : B and ult. a : d = A : D. In contempo- 
rary language, these are the well-known results that limits of 
sums, differences, and products are the sums, differences, or 
products of the limits of the respective quantities. In the case 
of Corollary 7, Bayes assumes a time (interval) T in which A:b = 
Afx :B+y, and at the end of which a, b, x, y all vanish. 
Hence a + b : b = A + B + x f y : B 2 y, "and at the end of that 
time also the four quantities a + b, b, x ? y and y . _ . vanish: 
wherefore by Defin. 6 ult. a + b : b = A + B : B" [Bayes 1736a, 
16, 171. 
Axioms 2 and 3 concern quantities that "flow uniformly or 
with a permanent fluxion." Indeed, axiom 2 asserts that a quan- 
tity flows uniformly "when changes made in it are always propor- 
tional to the times in which they are made," whereas axiom 3 says 
that the "fluxions of quantities uniformly flowing, are always in 
proportion to their synchronal changes . . .I' [Bayes 1736a, 171. 
Axioms 4 and 5 are of greater interest. They are, in effect, 
lemmas on inequalities that provide Dayes with a proof technique 
used later in the section. In axiom 4 Bayes introduces two flow- 
ing quantities: y, which increases or decreases uniformly, and 
x, the fluxion of which continually increases. Axiom 5 is simi- 
lar, but with the fluxion of x continually decreasing. Although 
Bayes gives these axioms without the use of symbols, the use of 
some appropriate notation here will help to give greater clarity 
and brevity to what follows. We let Ax and Ay denote the abso- 
lute values of the changes in x and y over an interval of time 
commencing at time 0 and ending at time e; the subscripts 0 and 
e denote the time of evaluation of the fluxions, and g j, . . . 
are the corresponding fluxions [21. With this notation, axiom 4 
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states that Ay : Ax < 4 : PO and Ay : Ax > 3 : Xe. Again it is 
necessary to recall that fluxions are non negative and that Ax, 
Ay, etc., denote the absolute value of the change [Bayes 1736a, 
17-181. 
Bayes comments on these axioms: 
Both these axioms are plain consequences from the 
obvious truth, that if anything increases with an 
accelerated velocity or swiftness, the increase made 
in given time will be greater than if it had all along 
increased with the same swiftness it did at the be- 
ginning, and less than if it had all along increased 
with the same swiftness it did at the end [Bayes 1736a, 
181. 
3. THE PROPOSITIONS OF SECTIONS 2 OF BAYES TREATISE 
Having stated his definitions and axioms, Bayes derives the 
properties of fluxions in nine propositions. Proposition 1 is 
Bayes' version of a basic result which, stated in the notation 
introduced above, may be expressed by 
ult. Ay:Az = je:Ze. 
As in axiom 4, y is a uniformly flowing quantity and z, like x, 
has a continually increasing fluxion. Bayes' proof, which de- 
pends on axiom 4, is made difficult to follow by his choice of 
notation. It is somewhat simplified when expressed in the nota- 
tion introduced above. Let t be a time interval ending at the 
instant e, with b as the beginning instant of the interval. Then 
ib = i, - hi, where A refers to the time interval t. By axiom 4 
we have $ : i, < Ay : AZ < j : 2, - Ai. Thus we may write Ay : AZ . - =y: Ze - XI where x will be always less than Ai. "Now as 
t continually decreases" the differences Ay, AZ, Ai and hence x 
must vanish, giving ult. Ay : AZ = j : ie. In modern notation. 
i Ai 
. 
e- < Az<tc. 
G au ;7 
Consequently, as Ai + 0, lim(Az/Ay) = i,/j [Bayes 1736a, 20-221. 
Propositions 2 and 3 are similar to Proposition 1, Proposi- 
tion 3 being the general one. In each of these propositions Bayes 
indicates that the parallel results concerning prime ratios are 
proved in similar ways [Bayes 1736a, 22-241. The main line of 
the argument is carried on in Propositions 5 to 9. I shall dis- 
cuss these results, leaving both the lemma that follows Proposi- 
tion 3 and Proposition 4 for consideration in Section 4. 
Propositions 5 to 7 concern the linearity property of differ- 
entiation. Here Bayes' convention, that all quantities and all 
fluxions are nonnegative, results in a slightly convoluted pro- 
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cedure. In particular, Proposition 7 says tha if A is a fixed 
quantity, then the fluxion of AZ is A times the fluxion of z. 
For if, with Bayes, we write x = AZ, then AZ : Ax = 1 : A; so by 
Proposition 3, $ : x = ult. AZ : Ax = 1 : A, or x = AZ [Bayes 
1736a, 27-301. 
Apart from the difficulty arising from the sign convention, 
these propositions give a convincing justification of the linear- 
ity property of fluxion--an aspect of fluxions which Newton gener- 
ally neglected. In a remark following Proposition 6, Bayes re- 
cognizes that the matter is simplified if he allows fluxions to 
be negative: 
In practice this change of the sign is neglected 
as useless, but then we consider the Fluxions of de- 
creasing quantities as negative, which comes to the 
same thing [Bayes 1736a, 301. 
Why, then, did Bayes adopt the nonnegative convention? A 
possible answer may be that this convention makes the inequalities 
in axioms 4 and 5 easier to handle. 
The fluxions of squares and products of flowing quantities 
are found in the next two propositions. 
g--if j = ~2 
To prove Proposition 
then ; = 2 x x--Hayes argues as follows: we seek 
the fluxion of y at x = A. Now Ay = Ax (2A + Ax), the negative 
sign holding for A > x, the positive sign for A < x. Thus Ay : Ax 
=l : 2A t Ax, and by Corollary 3 to Definition 6 and Proposition 
1, we have at x = A, 
; : ; = ult. Ay : Ax = 1 : 2A 
so 3 = Ai, and since x = A, this is the required result. 
The product of two flowing quantities x and y is considered 
in Propos.ition 9. If they both flow in the same direction (i.e., 
both either increase or decrease), then writing z = xy, v = 
x + Yr we have v2 = x2 + y2 + 22. By Propositions 5 and 8, 2vv = 
2x1; + 2yb + 2.5; so $ = (x + y) (Tf + cj, - xi - yj = XG + yx. The 
cases that arise when x and y flow in different directions are 
dealt with by using Proposition 6 and introducing the appropriate 
minus signs. Again Bayes remarks that if negative fluxions are 
allowed, then 2 = xi + y> holds in all cases [Bayes 1736a, 30- 
331. The straightforward way in which these propositions are 
proved indicates the value of Bayes' careful prior discussions 
of prime and ultimate ratios. 
4. MORE ON SECTION 2 
Some subsidiary results and further discussion appear below. 
In his proof of Proposition 1 Bayes remarks: 
If the Fluxion of z at the beginning of the time 
T, receives an instantaneous increment, which is not 
impossible, nor contrary to any thing supposed in the 
proposition, then z is to be looked upon as having two 
Fluxions at the given instant, one of which is that 
it would have had if no such alteration had been in 
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it; and the other is that it would have had if the 
same alteration had been made in it before the given 
instant and not then [Bayes 1736a, 221. 
This remark shows Bayes' appreciation of what we know as the 
left and right derivatives. Eighteenth-century references to 
left and right derivatives are few, although D'P.lember-t had the 
idea by 1780 [D'Alembert 1768-1780, Vol. 8, ". 3201. 
6de turn next to Lemma 1 and Proposition 4. In Lemma 1 (the 
only lemma, in fact) Bayes considers four flowing quantities, x, 
yr zt and v, and two fixed quantities satisfying in some period 
of time, least v:z $ A : B ,< greatest x : y. Here again I have 
put Bayes' verbal description of the inequality into symbolic 
form. Bayes writes "never greater" where I have written I'<." 
The conclusion that Bayes draws in this lemma is that at the final 
instant of the time interval, 
ult. v :z<A: B < ult. x : y. 
A similar result is derived for prime ratios or for a prime 
ratio on one side of the inequality and an ultimate ratio on 
the other. To prove this inequality Bayes argues that if "A : B 
should be greater than the ultimate ratio of x to y, let.the dif- 
ference between them be D. Then because x : y may be nearer to 
the ultimate ratio of x : y, then by the difference D, the ratio 
of A : B may be greater than that of x : y . . . which things are 
inconsistent." In a corollary to the lemma, he adds that if, fur- 
ther, ult. v : z = pm0 x : y, then both must be equal to A : B, 
since A : B lies between them [Bayes 1736a, 24-251. Again Bayes' 
proof contains arguments resembling those of the modern theory of 
limits. The introduction of this style of argument is usually 
attributed to Cauchy. 
In Proposition 4 Bayes attempts more than he can handle with 
prime and ultimate ratios. He considers the values of two flowing 
quantities z and x, at three instants at which z and x are, res- 
pectively, A - y and B - v, A and B, A - y + a and B - v + b; 
Y < a, v < b and, as usual, all letters denote positive quantities. 
However, Bayes assumes further that a : b remains fixed as y, V, 
a, and b diminish to zero [Bayes 1736a, 25-261. This additional 
requirement cannot be Indeed, 
Proposition 4, that d, 
imptsed. Bayes claims to prove, in 
:xg=a : b. Clearly this is impossible 
with the assumption that a : b is a fixed ratio. It is easy to 
see why Bayes imposes this condition--he wishes to apply Lemma 
1, which requires a fixed ratio a : b. In fact, it is clear that 
Bayes really wished to demonstrate here that lim(a : b) = EA : SrB. 
He correctly notes that ult. y : v = iA : :B and pm0 a - y : b -v = 
.zA : 
(b - x;B- 
He ought to have stated next that a : b = (a - y) + y : 
+ v and, hence, lim a : b = iA : 2,. However, Bayes 
could not have carried out this last step because a : b is a 
ratio of quantities which are evaluated neither before nor after 
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the instant when z = A and x = B; so he cannot take either prime 
or ultimate ratios. Although this shows the conceptual limita- 
tion of the ideas of ultimate and prime ratios, the failure of 
this proposition does not vitiate any of the subsequent results. 
Here Bayes uses it only for an alternative proof of Proposition 
8 [Bayes 1736a, 311. Bayes was motivated to attempt to prove 
this complicated result by Newton's inadequate proof that the 
fluxion of a product AB is Al? + Bi. His proof used the difference 
(A + &a)@ + $b) - (A - &)(B - Jib) rather than (A + a)(B + b) 
(B + b) - AB; this was one of Newton's arguments that Berkeley 
had criticized. 
5. SECTION 3 
In Section 3 Bayes responds to some of Berkeley's criticism 
of Newton's arguments. Berkeley had charged that in using intui- 
tive arguments with limits, Newton had assumed that a difference 
was both zero and nonzero, and that hi.-; inconsistency invalidated 
his proofs. In .response, Bayes examines two basic arguments of 
Newton: one in which Newton finds the fluxion of ;:n (in De Quad- 
ratura Curvarum) and another in which he finds the fluxion of the 
area under a curve. He clearly indicates the serial nature of 
Newton's assumption: at first he assumes a nonzero difference, 
and then he lets this difference "continually to decrease" [Bayes 
1736a, 361. Thus the structure of the argument does not, as 
Berkeley claims, have a difference simultaneously zero and non- 
zero. 
In this section Bayes disclaims the intention of considering 
the objections to fluxions raised by others: 
I have designedly taken notice only of those 
objections of the ingenious author of The Analyst 
. . . as for the differential method of Leibnitz, 
I do not undertake its defence . . . [Bayes 1736a, 
40-411. 
6. CONCLUSION 
Bayes' objective was to defend the essential correctness of 
Newton's results involving fluxions by giving an explanation of 
them which was mathematically sound--by the standards of his day-- 
and which, while remaining true to Newton's basic ideas, was freed 
from his overly concise and sometimes confusing modes of presen- 
tation. We must now consider whether or not Bayes succeeded. 
First I shall summarize the mathematical arguments in the 
admittedly anachronistic language of the 19th-century analysis. 
Bayes had proved: 
(i) If a limit exists, then it is unique (Corollary 1 to 
Definition 7); 
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(ii) if lim a,lim b exist, then lim(a f b) exist and are 
lim a Ir lim b; if lim(a/b), lim(b/d) exist, then lim(a/d) exists 
and is lim(a/b) - lim(b/d) (Corollaries 7, 8, and 9 to Definition 
7) . 
Furthermore, Bayes used in quite explicit form: 
(iii) the proof technique of showing a quantity to be zero 
by showing it to be less than any assignable magnitude. 
These basic limit results are used to establish: 
(iv) the fundamental result that the derivative (fluxion, 
instantaneous rate of change) is the limit of a quotient of fin- 
ite differences (axioms 4, 5); 
(v) the linearity property D(f + y) = Df + Dy (Propositions 
5 to 7); 
(vi) the product rule D(fg) = fDg + gDf (Proposition 9). 
And finally Bayes introduced: 
(vii) the idea of left and right derivatives. 
Returning now to the query raised above: did Bayes succeed? 
On grounds of the mathematical correctness and lucidity of his 
explanations, we cannot but answer: yes. He was able to see the 
essence of Newton's mathematical ideas and to observe that im- 
plicit in them was the procedure of using prime and ultimate ra- 
tios as the proof technique for the deduction of the basic results 
of fluxion theory. Moreover, Bayes was able to present them ex- 
plicitly and lucidly. Newton's fluxions were not presented in a 
rigorously satisfactory manner. Bayes showed that Newton's method 
could be adapted to provide convincing proofs of Newton's results- 
"convincing" here is meant to be in the sense of Bayes' own time. 
He had not achieved 19th-century rigor; he could not, nor should 
we expect this in the 18th century. 
Bayes' contribution to the foundations of statistical infer- 
ence, while not always enjoying uncritical acceptance, is of suf- 
ficient importance to warrant continued serious discussion. Al- 
though his work in the field of fluxions seems hitherto to have 
gone nearly unnoticed, it also deserves equal respect and study. 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
The author gratefully acknowledges the advice and criticism 
of J. N. Crossley and I. Grattan-Guinness, and the comments of 
anonymous referees. 
NOTES 
1. pmo is Bayes' abbreviation for primo; similarly, ult. is 
his abbreviation for ultimo. These should be read respectively 
as "prime, ultimate, ratio of." 
The concept of the prime ratio pm0 a : b = A : B is closely 
analogous to the present-day 
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lim a(t)/b(t) = A/B, t 4 t 0' 
similarly ult. a : b = A : B is analogous to 
lim a(t)/b(t) = A/B, t + to. 
2. This additional notation is anachronistic but is, I con- 
sider, justified to shorten and clarify the explanation here. 
The notation Ax is used to denote the absolute value of the change 
in x in order to conform to Bayes' procedure. 
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